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1 Introduction
Cross-border transport infrastructure plays the important role of supporting trade with
neighboring countries, which accounts for a signicant share of total trade (Bougheas et
al., 1999). The recent wave of regional integration is leading to greater needs for invest-
ment in the transport infrastructure serving the region, since a well-developed transport
infrastructure is essential for successful regional integration (Fujimura, 2004). Examples
of initiatives to facilitate regional integration include the Trans-European Transport Net-
work and the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project. At a
smaller geographical scale, connection of transport links between North and South Korea
is also considered as the project looking toward economic integration in the future.
Mun and Nakagawa (2008) discuss the problem of resource allocation concerning the
provision of cross-border transport infrastructure connecting two neighboring countries.
An investment in the infrastructure in one country decreases the transportation costs of
both import and export goods, which benets not only the home country but also the
neighboring country. In this case, independent decision making leads to under-investment
in infrastructure, since the investment decision of each country does not take into account
the benet to the other country. Mun and Nakagawa look at the role of foreign aid to
improve the efciency, and show that the aid may make not only the recipient but also
the donor better off. The limitation of this paper is that it focuses only on investment
decisions assuming that infrastructure use is free of charge.
Although free access to transport infrastructure (such as public roads) is widely ap-
plied, there exist types of transportation modes that impose user charges for infrastructure
(railways, ports, airports). At the same time, there has been an increasing tendency of
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tolling on public roads, for several reasons such as congestion management, obtaining
funds for road investments, etc. (Glaister and Graham, 2004; Lindsey, 2007). For exam-
ple, a truck tolling system was recently introduced in Germany in 2005.
The present paper extends our earlier work by including pricing policies. We develop
a simple two-country model of international trade where the transportation cost between
two countries depends on the capacity and user charge (e.g., road toll, rail fare) of in-
frastructure. Once we introduce pricing desision, there are wide variety of alternative
mechanisms for provision of cross-border transport infrastructure. The government of
each country chooses the capacity and user charge of infrastructure within its territory so
as to maximize the welfare of its citizens. The government faces the following trade-off:
investment in capacity would lower the transport cost and thereby increase the gains from
trade, but increase the scal burden; raising the user charge would increase the revenue
but decrease the gains from trade.
The earlier result of under-investment in the case of free access may be modied
if we incorporate pricing: the decision rule of choosing the capacity becomes efcient.
Investment induces increase in the volume of traded goods, which raises not only the gains
from trade but also the revenue from the user charge. The latter effect plays the role of
giving the governments incentives for greater investment. However, the pricing rule may
be inefcient in that each government levies an excessively high price for infrastructure
use. Thus, despite the efcient investment rule, the resulting capacity does not attain the
optimal level.
We examine alternative regimes with different pricing policies, and evaluate them in
terms of the service levels of infrastructure, and economic welfare of the two-country
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economy as a whole. Considering the fact that a growing number of transport infrastruc-
tures have been constructed and operated privately or by various forms of public-private
partnerships, we include the regimes with private involvement, such as prot maximiza-
tion by private operators, control of investment decisions of private rms by design of bid-
ding for franchise1. Furthermore, we consider the case of integrated provision in which
pricing and investment decision about the infrastructure in two countries is made by a
single authority or rm. This may provide useful insights about how the organization of
infrastructure provider affect the outcomes.
Recently, economists have become interested in pricing and investment decisions of
the transport infrastructure by multiple governments (Bond, 2006; De Borger, Dunker-
ley, Proost, 2007; Fukuyama, 2006; Levinson, 2000). Bond (2006) investigates the
consequences of independent decision making by governments concerning infrastructure
investment, and examined the effects of trade liberalization on the incentive to invest.
Fukuyama (2005) also discusses a similar problem by means of numerical simulations.
These papers focus only on investment decisions. Levinson (2000) looks at strategic in-
teractions between governments on a serial network. Levinson keeps the capacity xed,
and focuses on the choice of revenue raising mechanisms (tax versus toll). He nds that
larger regions are more likely to tax than smaller regions. Comprehensive review of the
1Roads are also operated privately (see Roth (1996)). De Palma and Lindsey (2000) analyze road pricing
in the case that roads are operated privately. Yang and Meng (2000) investigate the effect of a new road
project by BOT in the setting of network with route choice. Verhoef (2007) evaluates alternative highway
franchise regimes for different network structure, such as parallel and serial. The primary interests of these
works are the role of pricing to control trafc congestion, and they do not deal with the situation that
multiple governments are involved in pricing and investment of the transport infrastructure.
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literature is presented by Ubbels and Verhoef (2008).
Our paper is closely related to the recent work by De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost
(2007) that deals with pricing and investment in the setting of two transport links in series,
each of which is controlled by a different government. There are two types of trips in De
Borger et al: local trips and transit. Transit trips are neither originated from nor destined
to one of two regions, while trips between neighboring regions are assumed to be zero.
In contrast, our paper considers only trips between neighboring regions. In this sense,
our paper could be a complement to the work by De Borger et al. The model by De
Borger et al is quite suitable for small countries in European continent (e.g., Belgium)
where transit trafc have signicant share. In many other contexts such as trade within
Southeast Asia, North America, and Latin America, cross-border trafc is quantitatively
more important than transit trafc2. Unlike De Borger et al, our model ignores congestion.
This is a limitation, especially for application to the cases such as some transport routes
in Europe or in North America, but our model would be widely applicable to other cases.
In many transport routes, especially those between developing countries, low quality of
infrastructure (or missing links) is a signicant impediment for trade (see, e.g., Limao
and Venables (2001)). Our model assumes that infrastructure investment makes better
quality of pavement, wider road, less steep gradient, shortcut by tunnel, so on. These
changes increase speed, or saves fuel consumption, thereby reduces resource cost for
transportation. Many international programs such as ALTID in Asia aim at improving
the quality of infrastructures as well as mitigating congestion. Assuming the absence
2As suggested by the law of gravity in international trade, trade volume signicantly decline with dis-
tance. Thus it is natural to suppose that trafc between neighboring countries must be more signicant than
transit.
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of congestion enables us to obtain a number of analytical results, which are difcult to
obtain using the model with congestion. Our paper completely determines the signs of
responses to pricing and investment decisions of other country. More importantly, we
obtain the ranking of alternative regimes analytically, unlike numerical approach by De
Borger et al3. We include a larger set of alternative regimes such as prot maximization,
user cost minimization, and the investment with regulation on tolls. We make various
comparisons to illuminate the effects of alternative nancing instruments and choice of
organizations, i.e., integrate or separate provision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two-country model
of international trade with transport infrastructure. Section 3 describes the decision mak-
ing about pricing and investment of cross-border transport infrastructure under the alter-
native regimes: free-access, government pricing, break even pricing, prot maximization,
and user cost minimization. Section 4 discusses the case of integrated provision that a sin-
gle authority or rm decides on user charge and capacity of the transport infrastructure in
two countries. These alternative regimes are evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
3There are 3 regimes considered both in our paper and De Borger et al (2007). It turns out that, for
these 3 regimes, our analytical results are qualitatively the same as numerical results obtained by the model





Consider an economy with two countries, indexed by i (i = 1; 2). There are li households
in Country i. All households in the same country have identical preferences and labor
skills. The two countries may be different in population size, income, and preference.
This economy produces three goods, which are indexed by 1, 2, and z. The produc-
tions of Goods 1 and 2 are completely specialized, i.e., Country i produces Good i. Unlike
Goods 1 and 2, Good z is produced in both countries, which is set as the numeraire. Labor
is the only input for the production of the three goods. Each household in the economy
consumes all three goods. Thus, Country i exports Good i and imports Good j (j 6= i).
Goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
When Goods 1 and 2 are traded, transportation costs are incurred, whereas Good z is
transported without cost. The transportation costs of Goods 1 and 2 depend on the capac-
ity and user charge (e.g., road toll, rail fare) of infrastructure. We assume that the transport
infrastructure is produced from Good z with constant returns to scale technology.
2.2 Consumption











i , and zi are respectively the consumption of Goods i, j, and z. We assume
that ui is strictly increasing, quasi-concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Each
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household is endowed with one unit of labor and levied a poll tax. The household's
disposable income, yi, is dened as
yi = wi   i;
where wi and i are respectively the wage rate and poll tax in Country i. The budget
constraint is given by









where pii and p
j
i represent the prices of Goods i and j in Country i. We suppose that Goods
1 and 2 are non-inferior goods.






























Each of the three goods is produced with a linear production technology. The production
of Good i in Country i requires aii units of labor. It follows that
pii = wia
i
i; for i = 1; 2:




i ; for i = 1; 2;
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where azi is the amount of labor required to produce one unit of Good z in Country i.
Above setting of production model implies that factor price wi is determined by exoge-
nously given coefcient, azi , and thereby the terms of trade are constant. In this sense,
our model is essentially the partial equilibrium model.
2.4 Transportation and trade
We suppose that there is a single location in each country at which all production and
consumption take place. We call this location as a market. Traded goods are transported
between two markets. Labor is only input for the production of the transportation service.
The transport cost from the market in Country i to the border, ci, is dened as
ci = fi + witi;
where fi is the price of infrastructure use (user charge) within Country i; and ti is the
amount of labor required for transportation. We interpret ti as the transport time from the
market in Country i to the border of the two countries. ti depends on the capacity of the
transport infrastructure in Country i, namely,
ti = ti (ki) ;
where ki is the capacity of the transport infrastructure in Country i. We interpret the
capacity of infrastructure in broad sense: larger capacity may imply milder curves and
slopes, road surface or rail track with higher quality, etc. We assume that an investment
in transport infrastructure increases capacity, thereby saves the labor (or time) required
for transportation and that the investment is decreasing return to scale: t0i  dti=dki <
0; t00i  d2ti=dk2i > 0.
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The transport cost between two countries is given by c1 + c2. We assume perfect




j + c1 + c2; for i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i: (1)
3 Alternative Regimes for Pricing and Investment of Trans-
port Infrastructure
We consider the following six regimes: (O) the rst-best optimum, (F) free access regime,
(G) government pricing regime, (B) break even pricing regime, (P) prot maximization
regime, and (U) user cost minimization regime. Let us outline below the structures of
these regimes and our plan of investigation.
Regime O, the rst-best optimum, is dened as the allocation that maximizes the
global welfare. This regime serves as the benchmark to evaluate the efciency of alterna-
tive policies.
Regimes F, B, and G suppose that two governments separately decide on the policies
so as to maximize the national welfare. In Regime F, the government chooses the capac-
ity of infrastructure and collects a poll tax to nance the expenditure for this investment
while the infrastructure is free access, i.e. user charge is xed to zero. Regime B sup-
poses that the government chooses the capacity while the infrastructure charge is set so
that the revenue covers the expenditure for investment. In Regime G, the government
in each country chooses the capacity and infrastructure charge without constraint. Both
Regimes F and B are widely observed in the real world. For example, most public roads
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are free-access while fares of railways are regulated to be break-even. The comparison
between Regimes F and B enable us to evaluate the relative merits between two methods
for nancing the infrastructure investment: lump-sum taxation and user charge. It is also
possible to interpret the infrastructure charge as fuel tax that is proportional to the vol-
ume and distance of transportation. In this case, the comparison is between two types of
taxations. In Regime G, there is no restriction for the government in choosing the level
of infrastructure charge. It is interesting to see whether the decisions by the governments
seeking to maximize the welfare of citizens leads to better outcome than the cases with
restrictions such as Regimes F and B.
Regimes P and U are the cases of private involvement in the development of infrastruc-
ture. Private rm design, construct, then operate the infrastructure, is given the right to
levy the infrastructure charge and nance the cost for construction and operation. We
interpret that the design includes not only physical aspect such as the capacity but also the
plan of operation such as the choice of the infrastructure charge. Regime P assumes pure
private operation of infrastructure in that a private rm chooses user charge and capacity
to maximize the prot4. Although it is natural to assume such behavior of the private rm,
this is not compatible to the objective of the government that is to maximize the social
welfare. Regime U is an alternative mechanism that induces private rms to design the
infrastructure in a manner that is more compatible with the objective of the government.
This regime is implemented by the auction in which the right to construct and operate the
transport infrastructure is awarded to the rm proposing the plan that minimizes the user
4Regime P may be also implemented by an auction in which the right to construct and operate the
transport infrastructure is awarded to the rm offering the highest bid.
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cost5. Among many other alternative mechanisms, we choose the criterion of user cost
minimization for the following reasons. First, this regime has an advantage in practical
implementation that user cost is observable after the operation starts. So it is easier to
monitor and verify whether the design of infrastructure meets the criterion of the auc-
tion. Second, earlier works (e.g., Verhoef (2007)) show that this regime yields relatively
efcient outcome.
3.1 First-best optimum (Regime O)
In this paper, the rst-best optimum is characterized as the solution to a global welfare
maximization problem, which is called Regime O. The social planner chooses the user
charge, the capacity of infrastructure and the poll tax, to maximize the global welfare.
The problem to be solved is formulated as follows
max
f1;f2;k1;k2;1;2
W (v1; v2) (2)
subject to pk1k1 + p
k













j + f 1+f 2 + w1t1 + w2t2;wi   i

; j 6= i . W (:) is strictly increas-
ing and continuously differentiable in vi and quasi-concave with respect to the policy
variables, and pki is the amount of Good z required to produce one unit of the transport
infrastructure in Country i (or, unit cost of infrastructure). (3) is the budget constraint for
the two-country economy as a whole.
5Verhoef (2007) examines a number of alternative types of auction including those examined in our
paper. Note that trade volume must be maximized by user cost minimization. Thus User cost minimization
regime in our paper is essentially equivalent to the patronage maximization in Verhoef (2007). A contribu-
tion of our paper in this regard is to present a comparison between outcomes under private involvement and
government provision.
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The rst order conditions with respect to the capacity and the user charge are
   l1x21 + l2x12wit0i = pki (4)
fi = 0 (5)





2) multiplied by the marginal change in the transport cost by an investment in
transport infrastructure in Country i; ( wit0i). The LHS is the marginal benet of the
investment, while the RHS is the marginal cost.
Condition (5) means that infrastructure use should be free of charge. This is natural
since marginal cost of usage, such as operation cost or congestion, does not exist in our
model.
3.2 Free access, investment by national government (Regime F)
This regime has been discussed by Mun and Nakagawa (2008). In this regime, the gov-
ernment chooses the capacity of infrastructure and collects a poll tax to nance the ex-
penditure while user charge is xed to zero, i.e. the infrastructure is free access. The















The rst order condition of the above problem yields the following investment rule
 wit0ilixji = pki : (7)
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The LHS of equation (7) is marginal change in transport cost multiplied by the quan-
tity of Good j that Country i imports from Country j. Namely, the LHS is the marginal
benet to Country i of an investment in the transport infrastructure. The RHS is the
marginal cost of investment. Comparison between conditions (4) and (7) reveals that the
investment rule under free access is inefcient since the marginal benet to Country j
does not appear in the optimality condition, (7). Investment for infrastructure in Country
i reduces not only the price of import good of Country i but also that of Country j. The
latter is a spill-over benet to Country j , which the government of Country i does not
take into account in its investment decision.
Country i's optimum level of investment is given as the solution to equation (7). Since
the quantity of import good depends on the capacity of the transport infrastructure in
Country j, the solution to equations (7) is written as
ki = K
F
i (kj) for i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i: (8)
(8) is considered as Country i's best response function. As shown in Mun and Nakagawa
(2008), investment is a strategic complement, namely,
dKFi
dkj
> 0 for i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i:
Mun and Nakagawa (2008) show that equilibrium investment level under free-access
is smaller than the efcient level. This result is included in Proposition 1 in Section 5 of
this paper.
3.3 Pricing and investment by national government (Regime G)
In this regime, the government in Country i chooses not only the capacity of the transport
infrastructure but also the level of user charge. We call this regime the government pricing
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regime or Regime G. The government maximizes the welfare of its citizens subject to the







j + cj + f i + witi;wi   i

where i is obtained from the budget constraint, as follows
i =










Note that i may be negative: the government may choose the infrastructure charge
to earn the revenue in excess of expenditure. The rst order condition with respect to the







The LHS of (10) is the quantity of Good j imported by Country i that is equal to the loss
in consumer surplus. A rise in the user charge increases the price of the import good in
Country i, which harms the welfare of the consumers. The RHS of (10) is the reduction
in the tax burden caused by increase in revenue from the user charge. Note that the
revenue includes those paid by consumers in other country, j. Differentiating the budget


















6Differentiating equation (9) with respect to i and fi and rearranging the resulting equation yields the




















Substituting this equation into (10), we have the pricing rule.
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where xjic = @x
j








i=@yi. The numerator on the
RHS of (11) is the marginal revenue for the government. Pricing rule (11) is not efcient
due to the spill-over effects as follows. A rise in the user charge in Country i harms
consumers' welfare in Country j by increases in the price of import good, and reduces
revenue from infrastructure charge in j. These spill-over effects are not incorporated in
pricing decision by the government of Country i.






The LHS of (12) is the increase in Country i's consumer surplus from one unit increase in
the capacity of the transport infrastructure, which is the marginal benet of the investment.
The RHS is the increase in the tax burden to nance the investment, which is perceived
as the marginal cost of investment for the country. Condition (12) is the cost-benet rule
for the government that is concerned only with the welfare of its citizens. This is similar
to the investment rule in the Regime F, but the result is diffferent as shown below.



















The numerator of the RHS of (13) is the net effect on the government expenditure of
a one-unit investment on transport infrastructure. Note that the investment increases the
trade volume and the revenue from the infrastructure. The second term of the numerator is
the rise in revenue from infrastructure charge, which reduces the tax burden. Substituting











= pki : (14)
This equation is identical to the rst-best investment rule7. The government that is con-
cerned only about the welfare of its citizens takes into account the benet for the other
country's citizens in the end. In other words, it internalizes the spill-over effect of invest-
ment decision. This is because the investment generates additional benet as described
earlier: increase the revenue induced by the expansion of trade volume. This revenue
effect turns out to be equal to the benet for the other country's citizens.
Note that import and export trips in our model have different implications for national
welfare, as transit and local trips in De Borger et al. The effect of pricing and investment
decisions on national welfare is decomposed into changes in consumer welfare and toll
revenue. The former is related to import trip, while the latter is affected by both import and
export trips. Consumers welfare depends on price of import goods while toll revenue is
generated from both export and import trips. For example, higher toll reduces consumers
welfare but increases toll revenue. Positions of import and export trips in our paper are
respectively similar to those of local and transit trips in De Borger et al.
Country i's optimal levels of investment and infrastructure charge are the solutions
to equations (11) and (14). These equations include the quantity of traded goods that
depend on the capacity and user charge of the transport infrastructure not only in the
home country but also in the foreign country. Thus, the solutions are given in the form of
7Note that the equivalence of investment rule does not lead to optimal capacity level, since pricing rule
(11) is different from the rst-best policy. Although (14) looks the same as (4), the transport quantities xij
and xji in those equations are different because the quantities depend on the pricing policy. So the resulting
capacity should be different.
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response functions as follows
ki = K
G
i (kj; fj) ; (15)
fi = F
G
i (kj; fj) for i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i; (16)
where the super script G represents this regime.
The shape of response functions against changes in the policy variables of Country
j is not straightforward. When the demand for an import good does not depend on the
disposable income (xjiy = 0 for i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i), we obtain the following result. The
proof is given in Appendix.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the demand for import good in country i (i.e., Good j (j =
1; 2; j 6= i)) is independent of disposable income. Then, Country i's investment decisions

























where xjicc = @2x
j
i=@ (ci + cj)
2 and xijcc = @2xij=@ (ci + cj)
2.
This lemma implies that when the demand function for an import good is linear, the
pricing decisions are strategic substitutes8: Country i increases its price of infrastructure








use in response to an increase in Country j's capacity and to a decrease in Country j's
price. When the demand is nonlinear and sufciently convex, the pricing decisions may
be strategic complements9.
3.4 Break even pricing, investment by national government (Regime
B)
Suppose that the government is constrained to set the level of infrastructure charge such










= pki ki (18)
In contrast to the free-access case (Regime F), no tax is levied to cover the cost of in-
frastructure investment. Each government chooses the capacity of infrastructure to max-








j + cj + f i + witi;wi

s.t. (18)







Investment decision affects the national welfare through change in price of import
good that depends on ki and fi. Investment in infrastructure reduces transport cost by
9This result is not found in De Borger et al (2007) since they assume linear demand function. In addition,
we determine completely the signs of investment response, which De Borger et al do not succeed.
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time saving (the rst term on the LHS) while it increases the level of user charge to
cover the cost for investment (the second term on the LHS). These two effects should be























The LHS is the marginal effect of investment on revenue, in which the rst term is the
direct effect and the second term is the indirect effect through changes in volume of trade.






words, marginal change in infrastructure charge is equal to the marginal cost of investment









= pki . The investment rule in Regime B is again the same
as the rst-best. It is also shown that the investment decisions of two governments are
strategic complements, as in Regimes F and G.
Pricing rule is derived by substituting the investment rule into the budget constraint
(18). As in Regime G, pricing decision may be either strategic complement or substi-
tute. The government raises infrastructure charge in response to increase in infrastructure
charge in other country if fiwit00i > (wit0i)
2, and vice versa10. Note that the direction of the
response depends on the form of the transport time function, ti(ki), unlike the Regime G
where the response depends on the form of the demand function. When the transport time
function is linear, the pricing decisions are strategic substitutes. On the contrary, when
the function is sufciently curved, the pricing decisions are strategic complements.
10We omit the details of the condition dividing the directions of response, which is available from the
authors upon request.
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3.5 Prot maximization by private providers (Regime P)
Suppose an auction in which the right to build and operate the transport infrastructure is
awarded to the rm offering the highest bid. We assume that this auction is competitive
in that there are sufcient number of equally productive rms, that no rm has a market
power in the bidding process, and that there is no collusion between rms. To win the
auction, each rm should choose the plan that maximizes the prot11. We call this regime
the prot maximization regime or Regime P. In this case, the winning rm, the provider




































The pricing rule is given by (22). The LHS is the marginal revenue for the provider.
Since there is no operation cost, any change in trafc does not affect the cost of the
provider. Thus, (22) is the condition of revenue maximization. From equations (21) and









= pki : (23)
Prot maximizing investment rule is identical to the rst-best rule as in the cases of gov-
ernment provision.
11For the winner, the prot net of the bid will be zero.
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Response to policy choice of other country is similar to that in the Regime G: in-
vestment decision is strategic complement, and pricing decision may be either strategic
complement or substitute depending on the shape of the demad curve12.
3.6 User cost minimization (Regime U)
In this regime, competitive bidding is designed so that the right to construct and operate
the transport infrastructure is awarded to the rm proposing the plan that minimizes the
user cost. We call this regime the user cost minimization regime or Regime U. To win the
bid, the rm should choose the lower user charge or larger capacity of the infrastructure,
which makes its prot go down. But the plan should be designed to keep the prot non-











  pki ki = 0
Note that the constraint of the problem is the same as that for the break even regime
(Regime B). Although the objective functions of Regimes B and U look different, maxi-
mizing the utility (Regime B) is equivalent to minimizing the user cost (Regime U): the
policy variables fi; ki affect only the user cost among the arguments in the utility func-
tion13.
12Conditions to determine the direction of response are slightly different from those for the Regime G.
We omit the details of this result, which is available from the authors upon request.




j + cj + ci;wi   i

, i = 0 in Regime U since cost for investment of
infrastructure is covered by the revenue from user charge. In this case, the policy variables fi; ki affect only
ci.
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Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma 2 User cost minimization regime (Regime U) yields the same outcome as the
Break-even regime (Regime B) .
It follows from the above lemma that the investment rule under Regime U is also
efcient.
The equivalence result between Regimes B and U depends on the assumptions of our
model: the absence of incentive problem due to asymmetric information; no difference in
productivities between public and private sectors. We point out one potential advantage
of Regime U over Regime B. Under Regime U, the objective function is the user cost
that is observable, and the competitive bidding process ensures that the infrastructure is
designed according to the postulated pricing and investment rule. On the other hand, the
objective function under Regime B, the welfare of citizen, is not directly observable, and
it is difcult to verify whether infrastructure is provided in accordance with the objective
of the government. Other than those above, there are a number of factors that make
difference between Regimes B and U.
4 Case of Integrated Provision
Integrated provision means that a single decision maker controls pricing and investment
of infrastructure across two countries. We deal with all regimes considered in the last
section, which suppose separate provision. We put superscript "I" on the symbols to
represent the regimes under integrated provision, such as Regime FI , GI , BI , PI and UI .
The rst three regimes ( FI , GI , BI) suppose that two governments cooperatively establish
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an authority that chooses pricing and investment policy to maximize the global welfare
of the two country economy as a whole14. On the other hand, in Regimes PI and UI ,
a single private rm is awarded the right to build and operate the infrastructure across
two countries. The example is Channel Tunnel project between UK and France, in which
Eurotunnel is a single concessionaire created by a group of ten construction companies
and ve banks.
We omit the detailed description of regimes to avoid redundant presentation, and dis-
cuss below the results of comparisons.
First, it is straightforward that Regimes FI and GI yield the same outcome as the
rst-best. In Regime FI , user charge is free as in the rst-best, and investment level is
chosen so as to maximize the global welfare. In Regime GI , the problem to be solved
by the authority is identical to the rst-best: maximizing global welfare, (2), subject to
integrated budget constraint, (3).
The following lemma shows that integrated provision does not affect the resource
allocation for the Regimes B and U. In the rest of this paper, the proofs of lemmas and
propositions are given in Appendix.
Lemma 3 Break even regime under integrated provision (Regime BI) yields the same
outcome as in the case of separate provision (Regime B). This result also holds for the
user cost minimization regime (Regimes UI and U).
Let us look at the prot maximization regime. In this case, the integrated provision has
an advantage over the separate provision in that the former avoids the double marginal-
14This paper focuses on the aspect of resource allocation. We do not deal with the conditions for the
establishment of the cooperation on which two governments agree.
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ization. The problem of prot maximization is that the private rm does not consider the
welfare of users in pricing and investment decisions. On the other hand, the government
pricing regime takes into account the welfare of users in the home country. Note that the
double marginalization arises in the government pricing regime under separate provision.
So the question here is what is the relation between these positive and negative effects:
double margins or disregarding users welfare.
Lemma 4 If the demand for import good is independent of disposable income, prot
maximization regime under integrated provision (Regime PI) and government pricing
regime under separate provision (Regime G) yield the same outcome.
Lemma 4 shows that, in the absence of income effect, loss of users' welfare in the
Regime PI is exactly offset by avoiding double marginalization that arises in the Regime
G.
It follows from the discussion above that the results of all regimes under integrated
provision are found in Section 3. It should be noted that the above results of equivalences
between regimes may come from the assumptions of the model such as the absense of
term of trade effects between countries.
5 Evaluation of Alternative Regimes































for i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i; (24)
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where ea; eb; ma; and mb are parameters representing the preferences for consump-
tions of the export and import goods. Then, the demand of a household in Country i for
Good j is given by
xji = mb exp
  mapji : (25)
We also specify the function describing the transport technology as
ti (ki) =   ln kik ; (26)
k is the upper limit of the capacity of the transport infrastructure (k = 1)15.
We present 11 regimes in Sections 3 and 4: 6 regimes for separate provision and 5
regimes for integrated provision.
From Lemmas 2, 3, 4, we see the following relations:
Regime O = Regimes FI , GI ,
Regime U = Regimes B, BI and UI .
Regime G = Regime PI ,
The last result comes from our specic utility function (24) that implies the absence of
income effect on the demand for traded goods. In the following discussion, the results for
the regimes on the LHS represent those on the RHS, which are omitted hereafter. So the
effective number of regimes is reduced to 5 regimes: the above 3 (O, U, G) plus regimes
F, P.
15The utility function (24) is similar to that used by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1988). As demon-
strated in the proof of propositions in Appendix, this specication together with (26) greatly simplies the
analysis.
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5.1 Case of a symmetric economy
Suppose that the sizes and technologies (incomes) of two countries are identical. We
present the ranking of the regimes for several criteria such as the capacity of infrastructure,
transport cost, and global welfare.
In the following, superscripts indicate the regimes: O represents the rst best opti-
mum, F the free access regime, G the government pricing regime, P the prot maximiza-
tion regime and U the user cost minimization regime. First, the capacities of infrastructure
under alternative regimes are ranked as follows.
Proposition 1 In a symmetric economy, the capacities for the alternative regimes
satisfy the following relations
kOi > k
U
i  kFi > kGi > kPi if mawi 
1
2









i if mawi >
1
2
log 2; for i = 1; 2;
The investment levels in Regimes G and P, in which the investment rule is efcient,
are lower than that in Regime F in which the investment decision is not efcient. Note
that the marginal benet of investment (LHS of the expression for the investment rule) is
proportional to the volume of trade. In Regimes G and P, the volume of trade is smaller
due to the higher infrastructure charge. This effect reduces the marginal benet, and
thereby leads to a smaller level of investment. The ranking of the free access regime (F)
and the user cost minimization regime (U) depends on the wage rate, the slope of demand
function for import good and transport technology. If the demand is more elastic (smaller
ma), transport technology is backward (smaller ), or wage rate is lower (smaller wi),
the level of investment in the user cost minimization is higher than that in the free access
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regime.
The transport cost represents the service level of the infrastructure, which depends not
only on the capacity but also on the infrastructure charge. Thus, the ranking of transport
cost is different from that of the capacity:
Proposition 2 In a symmetric economy, the infrastructure charges for trip between
two countries are ranked as follows
fP > fG > fU > fF = fO;
where f r = f r1 + f r2 , for r = O;F;G; P;and U: Combining the above result and Proposi-
tion 1, we obtain the ranking of transport costs as follows
cP > cG > cU > cF > cO;
where cr = cr1 + cr2 for r = O;F;G; P;and U:
Note that the above results concerning the rankings among Regimes O, G, U, P hold
also in asymmetric cases. In other words, the assumption of symmetry is needed only
to obtain the relation between Regime F and others. Unlike the levels of investment, the
ranking is not contingent: user cost in Regime U is necessarily higher than that in Regime
F. This result holds, even in the case that the level of investment is higher in Regime U.
The price effect dominates the effect of larger capacity. Other relations are consistent with
those in Proposition 1.
We dene global welfare as the sum of utilities of all households in the economy, that
is, W = l1v1 + l2v2 ; the utility function specied as (24) is a quasi-linear form, so the
utility level is measured in monetary terms. We have the ranking of the global welfare as
follows:
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Proposition 3 In a symmetric economy, the levels of the global welfare for the alter-
native regimes are ranked as follows
WO > WU  W F > WG > W P if mawi   = 0:229966;
WO > W F > WU > WG > W P if mawi >  for i = 1; 2;





  1 +  = 0:
Proposition 3 shows that the second-best regime may be different depending on the pa-
rameters. The second-best regime in a symmetric economy is the user cost minimization
(Regime U) when the value of (mawi) is relatively small, in other words, the demand
is more elastic, transport technology is backward, or the wage rate is lower. Otherwise,
the second-best regime is the free access (Regime F). The calibration of the model based
on data in Japan suggests that the value of (mawi) is very small (much smaller than
0.1)16. Therefore, it is likely that the user cost minimization is more efcient than the free
access. Recall Lemma 2 that the user cost minimization is equivalent to the break-even
pricing. This implies that nancing by user charge (Regimes B or U) is more efcient
than by taxation (Regime F). Ohsawa (2000) obtains the similar result even though he
adopts different rule of policy choice: his model supposes that the pricing and investment
policies are determined by voting.
The pricing by national governments (Regime G) is less efcient than the free-access
(Regime F). Recall that pricing rule is efcient but investment rule is inefcient in Regime
16We also use the calibrated model in the next section to see whether asymmetry between countries affects
the results here. Details of the calibration and simulation results are included in working paper version,
which is available from http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~mun/papers/Pricing_and_investment091006.pdf
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Table 1: Ranking of regimes in terms of the global welfare
Regime Separate Integrate
F 3 (2) 1 (1)
G 4 (4) 1 (1)
B 2 (3) 2 (3)
P 5 (5) 4 (4)
U 2 (3) 2 (3)
Note: Figures in the parenthesis are ranks when mawi > .
F. On the other hand, pricing rule is inefcient but investment rule is efcient in Regime
G. The above result suggests that the distortion of pricing in Regime G dominates the loss
owing to inefcient investment rule in Regime F.
Table 1 summarizes the above results to give an overview of welfare ranking among al-
ternative regimes. This table is also useful to see the equivalences between some regimes.
The regimes having the same numbers on cells attain the same results.
De Borger et al (2007) also examined Regimes F, G and O as in our paper, which
are respectively termed No tolls, Uniform tolls and Centralized differentiation17.
Recall that their model incorporates congestion externality. Our analytical results con-
17De Borger et al suppose that infrastructure charges for local and transit trips may be discriminated.
We do not consider the discrimination since charging different fees for import and export (directions of
transportation) is impractical in our setting. For the same reason, the regime corresponding local toll only
in De Borger et al is also out of consideration (it is difcult to justify that only one of import or export is
charged).
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cerning the ranking of three regimes are the same as numerical results in De Borger et al.
This suggests that ignoring congestion does not affect the qualitative results signicantly.
In other words, strategic interaction between governments is a more crucial factor for the
welfare results than congestion externality.
5.2 The effects of asymmetry
We examine the effect of asymmetry between two countries in population size and the
wage rates. We have some analytical results concerning the effect of difference in pop-
ulation size. Let us focus on the population distribution holding the sum of the popula-
tion of the two countries constant. Let si be Country i's share of population such that
si = li= (l1 + l2).
Proposition 4 Under the free-access regime, the effect of population distribution on
investment levels of the two countries are
@kF1
@s1
R 0 () s1 Q 1  maw2;
@kF2
@s1
R 0() s1 Q maw1;
The effect on the user cost is
@cF
@s1
Q 0() s1 Q w1
w1 + w2
:
In addition, suppose that the production technology in the two countries are identical,








The effect of population distribution on the level of investment may be either posi-
tive or negative. Since the value of mawi is small as already mentioned, maw1 <
s1 < 1   maw2 unless population distribution is extremely uneven. It is likely that
@kF1 =@s1 > 0 and @kF2 =@s1 < 0. In words, the level of investment is increasing with the
population share of home country.
When the wage rates in two countries are identical, the transport cost, cF , is increas-
ing with asymmetry in population size. This is because investment in infrastructure is
decreasing returns: when the population size in the larger country increases and the size
of the smaller country decreases by the same units, the larger country increases its in-
vestment and the smaller country decreases. However, the transport cost reduction in the
larger country is smaller than the transport cost increase in the smaller country. Conse-
quently, increasing the asymmetry increases the transport cost and decreases the global
welfare.
We turn to the other regimes.























R 0 and @c
r
@s1
Q 0() p11 R p22; i = 1; 2; r = O;G; P; U:














Proposition 5 shows that the effects of population distribution on the investment lev-
els and transport cost depend on the difference in the FOB prices. This is explained as
follows. In this model, the transport costs of Goods 1 and 2 are identical. The ratio of
the transported quantity of Good 1 to that of Good 2 is determined by the ratio of the
FOB prices. Suppose that the FOB price of Good 2 is lower than that of Good 1. Then,
a household in Country 1 consumes more Good 2 than a household in country 2 con-
sumes Good 1. An increase in the size of Country 1 and corresponding decrease in the
size of Country 2 raises the quantity transported between the two countries. This increase
in the transportation raises the investment and reduces the transport cost. These effects,
however, do not affect the ranking of the regimes.
Corollary 1 Among Regimes O, G, P, and U, the rankings of the transport cost be-
tween two countries and the global welfare levels are not affected by asymmetry in popu-
lation size.
This corollary is derived from Propositions 1, 2, and 3. What is left unknown is the
relationship between Regime F and other regimes under asymmetry in country size18. We
examine numerically the effect of asymmetry on the relative performance of Regime F
and other cases. Numerical results suggest that the ranking between Regime F and others
is not affected unless population distribution is extremely asymmetric19.
18As Proposition 1 shows, the service levels and global welfare under Regime F are variable depending
on the population distribution.




The primal objective of our paper is to evaluate the effects of alternative pricing and
investment policies on service level of cross-border transport infrastructure and economic
welfare of two neighboring countries.
If the use of infrastructure is free of charge, the national government does not take
into account the benet of investment in a neighboring country, which leads to under-
investment in terms of resource allocation for the two-country economy as a whole. On
the other hand, it is shown that the investment rule becomes efcient if infrastructure
charge is levied. It is interesting that this result holds for all regimes with charging,
regardless their differences in objective functions, nancial constraints, and organization
of decision units20. We show that the investment level under the government pricing
regime (Regime G) is smaller than that under free access (Regime F). This is because the
user charge would be inefciently high, which negatively affects the level of investment
despite the efcient rule. Distortion of pricing in Regime G exceeds the loss owing to lack
of incentive in investment decision in Regime F. This result does not mean that pricing
is necessarily harmful. We show that Regime B (U) may attain higher welfare than the
free access. This result suggests that a more efcient mechanism with pricing could be
20This result is valid in the case that pricing and investment decisions are made simultaneously, unlike
sequential decision making in De Borger et al. We also examine the case of sequential decision making,
and it turns out that the investment rule may be inefcient. The results are unchanged in Regimes B and U,
whereas the investment rules are generally different from the efcient ones in Regimes G and P. However,
under the specic utility function in Section 5, the investment rules are efcient in all regimes with pricing.
Therefore the results there are still valid for the case of sequential decision making. The details of the
analysis in this case are available from the authors upon request.
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designed. We need to make further efforts in the future to explore the possibility of nding
better mechanisms.
We also investigate theoretically the relationship between regimes. It is shown that
seemingly different regimes yield the same outcome: e.g., Regimes G and PI , Regimes
B and U, etc. As for the number of decision units (i.e., separate or integrated), inte-
grated provision improves efciency in most cases while there is no effect of integration
in Regimes B and U.
The structure of regimes considered in our paper are purely simplied, so may be far
from the real practices. But the real practices can be considered as blends of elements
in some regimes examined here. Therefore our results may provide some insights for
understanding the consequences of policy design.
Appendix
This appendix gives the proofs of lemmas and propositions. Throughout the appendix, we
simplify the notation as follows: the quantity of Good j imported by Country i is written
as Ni = lixji , and N = N1+ N2 . The derivatives of Ni are written as
Nic =
@Ni
@ (c1 + c2)
; Nicc =
@2Ni
@ (c1 + c2)
2 ; for i = 1; 2;
Nc = N1c +N2c; Ncc = N1cc +N2cc:
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Proof of Lemma 1
We use the above simplied notations to rewrite the pricing and investment rules, (11)
and (14), as follows
Nj + fiNc = 0; (27)
 Niwit0i   pki + fiNcwit0i = 0: (28)
Solving (27) and (28) with respect to fi and ki for a given cj , we get Country i's
pricing and investment decisions as functions of the transport cost in Country j, eFGi (cj)
and eKGi (cj). Then, Country i's responce functions are given by
FGi (kj; fj) =
eFGi (fj + wjtj (kj)) and KGi (kj; fj) = eKGi (fj + wjtj (kj)) : (29)
Note that we assume no income effect on the demand for an import good. Differentiating
(27) and (28) with respect to fi; ki, and cj yields
(Njc +Nc + fiNcc) dfi + (Njc + fiNcc)wit
0





  (Nic   fiNcc) (wit0i)2  Nwit00i
i
dki
+( Nic + fiNcc)wit0idcj = 0: (31)


























i   (Nic   fiNcc) (wit0i)2  Nwit00i
 > 0:
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G > 0 follows from the second order condition for the government's problem under
Regime G. Thus, we get
d eFGi
dcj









































where wjt0j < 0. Substituting (32) and (33) in (34), Lemma 1 is obtained.
Proof of Lemma 3
In this proof, we show that integrated provision in the break even regime (Regime BI)
yields the same outcome as in the case of separate provision (Regime B). Using the
Lemma 2, equivalence of integrated and separate provision also holds for the user cost
minimization regime (Regimes UI and U).




subject to fN   pk1k1   pk2k2 = 0: (35)
Solving the rst order conditions of this problem, we get
 wit0iN = pki : (36)
The optimal level of investment and the optimal infrastructure charge in Regime BI are
given as the solutions to equations (35) and (36).
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In Regime B, the investment rule is identical to (36) as shown in the text. Aggregating
equation (18) and using the relation, f = f1 + f2, we have
fN   pk1k1   pk2k2 = 0;
which is identical to (35).
The system of equations to be solved is the same between the two cases, i.e., (35) and
(36). Thus, the outcome of these two cases should be the same.
This result is guaranteed if the solution of the equation system is unique. The sufcient
condition for the uniqueness is given by21
N +














whereKi (N) is the solution of equation (36) with respect to ki takingN as a given. Since
this is a sufcient condition, the solution may be unique if the above inequality does not
hold. Even if the solution is not unique and different results emerge, it is not owing to
different regimes but to the properties of equation system, or solution algorithms.
Proof of Lemma 4
In Regime P I , the rm's problem is given by
max
f;k1;k2
 = fN   pk1k1   pk2k2
We assume that the demands for import goods do not depend on the disposable income.
Solving the rst order conditions, we obtain the pricing and investment rules as
fNc +N = 0; (37)
 wit0iN = pki : (38)
21We omit the derivation of this sufcient condition, which is available from the authors upon request.
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In Regime G, summing up equations (11) for two countries, we get
(f1 + f2)Nc +N = 0:
Since f1 + f2 = f , we have equation (37). The investment rule in Regime G is equal to
(38). Thus, Regimes P I and G should solve the same system of equations, (37) and (38).
We examined the uniqueness of the solution as above, but omit the details.
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3
These propositions give the ranking of the regimes with respect to the investment level,
the transport cost, and the global welfare. We represent the amount of import goods in
terms of the infrastructure charges and the investment levels. Using (25), the amount of
Good j consumed in Country i becomes
Ni = mbXi exp ( mac) ;
where Xi = li exp
  mapjj : Using (26), the transport cost is written as
c = f   w1 ln k1   w2 ln k2: (39)
Thus, we can write
Ni = mbXi exp ( maf) kA11 kA22 and N = mbX exp ( maf) kA11 kA22 ; (40)
where Ai = mawi and X = X1 +X2.
The indirect utility of a household in Country i is given by








Using the budget constraints of households and governments, the global welfare is written
as






N   pk1k1   pk2k2; (41)
whereW = l1w1 + l2w2 + (l1x11 + l2x22) =ea.
Regime r (r=O,G,P,U)
Consider Regimes O, G, P, and U. First, we derive the investment level. Using (26) and
(40), the investment rule can be rewritten as
mbwiX exp ( maf) kAi 1i kAjj = pki for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (42)
Taking logarithms of both sides of the above equation, we have







: The stability condition of this system is given by
1  A1   A2 > 0 (44)
Solving (43) yields the investment level in Regime r (r=O,G,P,U); kri ; as a function of the
sum of the infrastructure charges, f r:
ln kri =
1
1  A1   A2 [ maf
r + (1  Aj) lnBiX + Aj lnBjX] : (45)
Secondly, the transport cost in Regime r, cr, is rewritten as a function of the infrastruc-
ture charge. Substituting (45) in (39) yields
cr =
f r   w1 lnB1X   w2 lnB2X
1  A1   A2 : (46)
From (44), (45) and (46), we obtain @kri =@f r < 0 and @cr=@f r > 0.
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Thirdly, we focus on the global welfare. Substituting (40), (42) and (45) in (41), we
rewrite the global welfare as









g (f r) = (maf
r + 1  A1   A2) exp
  maf r
1  A1   A2

:




  (ma)2 f r
1  A1   A2 exp
  maf r
1  A1   A2

< 0 for f r > 0;
which implies that @W r=@f r < 0.
Fourthly, we derive the ordering of the regimes with respect to the infrastructure
charge. Using the pricing rule, the sum of the infrastructure charges is given by
fO = 0; fG =
1
ma





Thus, the ordering with respect to the infrastructure charge is given by22
fO < fU < fG < fP : (49)
Since @kri =@f r < 0, @cr=@f r > 0 and @W r=@f r < 0, we derive the ordering with respect








O < cU < cG < cP ; WO > WU > WG > W P :
22In inequality (49), the ordering of fG and fU is derived as follows: using (44), we have
fG   fU = (1 A1  A2) =ma > 0:
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Regime F








Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (50), we get
(Ai   1) ln ki + Aj ln kj =   ln (BiXi) for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
Solving the above equation yields the equilibrium levels of investment as follows:
ln kFi =
1
1  A1   A2 [(1  Aj) ln (BiXi) + Aj ln (BjXj)] : (51)
Using (39) and (51), we obtain the transport cost as
cF =
 w1 ln (B1X1)  w2 ln (B2X2)
1  A1   A2 : (52)
Substituting (40), (50), and (51) in (41) yields















Comparison of the regimes in a symmetric economy
In a symmetric economy, we have




2; A1 = A2; B1 = B2; X1 = X2:
Substituting these equations in (51), (52), and (53), we obtain
ln kFi =
1
1  2A1 [ln (B1X)  ln 2] ; (54)
cF =
 2w1 ln (B1X) + 2w1 ln 2
1  2A1 ; (55)
W F = W +
mb
ma










Comparing (54) to (45), we obtain
kOi > k
U
















Comparing (55) to (46), we get
cO < cF < cU < cG < cP :
























Consider the RHS of (57). We have





1 2A1   1 + A1 Q 0:
Let  to be the solution of the following equation:(2=e)
2
1 2   1 +  = 0. Then, we get23
W F R WU , A1 R :
23This outcome is derived as follows. Let h (x) = (2=e)
2x
1 2x . Then, function h (x) satises
h (0) = 1; h0 (0) >  1; lim
x! 12




Thus, there is a unique point  2  0; 12 such that h ()  (1  ) = 0:We also have
h (x)  (1  x) R 0 , x Q :
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Thus, the ordering of the regimes with respect to the global welfare is given by
WO > WU  W F > WG > W P if maw1  ;
WO > W F > WU > WG > W P if maw1 > :
Proof of Proposition 4
In this proposition, we derive how the population distribution affects the outcome of
Regime F. Among the variables determining the investment level, X1 and X2 depend
on the population distribution as follows
X1 = s1 (l1 + l2) exp
  map22 ; (58)
X2 = (1  s1) (l1 + l2) exp
  map11 : (59)






1  A2   s1











 (w1 + w2)













R 0, s1 Q maw1;
@cF
@s1
R 0, s1 R w1
w1 + w2
:
Next, we suppose that w1 = w2 and a11 = a22. The global welfare, (53), becomes
W F = W +
mb
ma
(l1 + l2) exp
  map22 (1  A1) (B1X1) A11 2A1 (B2X2) A11 2A1 :
45





W F  W A1 (1  2s1)
(1  2A1) s1 (1  s1) :
SinceW F  W > 0, we have
@W F
@s1
R 0, s1 Q 1
2
:
Proof of Proposition 5
In this proposition, we explore the relationship between the population distribution and
the outcome of Regime r (r=O, G, P, U). First, consider the infrastructure charge. From





























= 0 for r = O;P; U:
The investment levels in Regimes O, G, P, and U are given by (45). Among the
independent variables of kri , X depends on the population distribution. Differentiating






(l1 + l2) [exp ( map22)  exp ( map11)]





R 0, p11 R p22:




  (w1 + w2) (l1 + l2) [exp ( map22)  exp ( map11)]




Q 0, p11 R p22:
Finally, we suppose that w1 = w2 and a11 = a22 and investigate the global welfare.










= 0 for r = O;G; P; U:
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